Global Taiwan Brief – Volume 2, Issue 7
Changing of the Guard at the CASS-Institute of Taiwan Studies
By: Russell Hsiao
The Role of PLA Base 311 in Political Warfare against Taiwan (Part 3)
By: Elsa B. Kania
History and Current Developments Regarding Taiwan’s Coast Guard Administration
By: Lyle J. Morris
Prioritizing Taiwan’s Southbound Policy in Tourism: Enhancing the Domestic-International Nexus
By: Alan H. Yang and Sherry Liu
Changing of the Guard at the CASS-Institute of Taiwan Studies
Russell Hsiao is the Executive Director of the Global Taiwan Institute and the Editor-in-Chief of the Global Taiwan Brief.
After months of speculation about a pending shakeup within Beijing’s Taiwan apparatus, media outlets from Taiwan are now reporting that Zhou Zhihuai (周志懷), who has been serving as the director of the Institute of Taiwan Studies (台湾研究所) at the government’s premier research institution—the Chinese Academy of Social Science (CASS, 中國社會科學院)—is stepping down.
Zhou began serving as ITS director in 2013, replacing Yu Keli (余克禮), who held the same position for a decade(2003 – 2013). Zhou, who was born in 1956, reportedly stepped down because he reached the retirement age of 60. Zhou’s supposed retirement ushers in a changing of the guard at one of the PRC’s leading research institutes on Taiwan. It should be noted that Zhou is still identified as ITS director on the institute’s website as of this writing.
Although Zhou is reportedly relinquishing his post as ITS director, he will retain his other title as the executive vice president and secretary-general of the non-governmental National Taiwan Research Association (全國臺灣研究會). The National Taiwan Research Association is part of the United Front system comprised of academics researching Taiwan across the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The president currently listed on its website is the late economist and former vice chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress Cheng Siwei (成思危).
While never officially confirmed by the Chinese government, CASS-ITS is believed to be directly subordinate to the Ministry of State Security (MSS). Its funding and staff are reportedly provided by the PRC’s premier intelligence agency and ITS ostensibly serves an intelligence gathering and analysis function for MSS.
Zhou is reportedly being replaced by Yang Mingjie (楊明杰). The 52 year-old Yang (b. 1965) most recently served as associate dean of the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations (中國現代國際關係研究院). A graduate of the prestigious Peking University, Yang’s research has focused on arms control and Asia-Pacific security. Yang also spent several years abroad, including stints as a visiting scholar at the Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies at Harvard University, visiting researcher at the DC-based Henry Stimson Center, and researcher at the Japan-based Institute of International Policy Studies.
According to an unclassified study released by the US intelligence community’s Open Source Center (OSC), CICIR is affiliated with the PRC’s Ministry of State Security. As the OSC study notes, “CICIR’s affiliation with the MSS is rarely acknowledged in the PRC media.” CICIR has a research institute focused on Taiwan policy studies. The current director of CICIR’s Center for Taiwan Studies (涉台事務研究中心) is Guo Yongjun (郭擁軍).
While Zhou was reportedly replaced because of reaching the mandatory retirement age, he had only been head of ITS for three years, compared to his predecessor’s decade in the same position. Another plausible explanation is that Zhou was dismissed in the aftermath of comments that he had made in late November at a cross-Strait conference in Guangxi province. Indeed, since Tsai Ing-wen has been in office, Beijing has been doubling down on the so-called “1992 consensus” and Zhou’s comments at that conference indicating that Beijing was open to alternatives to this formulation directly contradicted the official line. The official line was reiterated and reinforced by Politburo Standing Committee member Yu Zhengsheng (俞正聲) in the most recently concluded Taiwan affairs meeting before the Lunar New Year.
Some observers believe that the change in personnel at CASS-ITS indicates an imminent shift in Beijing’s policy towards Taiwan. Such change is not likely in the near term, since policy is set at the much higher level of the Taiwan Affairs Leading Small Group. Yet, a change in personnel does suggest an alteration in the approach towards Taiwan policy. Indeed, Yang is not a Taiwan expert per se like his two predecessors. Furthermore, given CICIR’s known linkages with the MSS, it would appear as though Beijing no longer feels the need to mask the intelligence function of CASS-ITS.
The main point: The personnel change at CASS-ITS likely does not indicate an imminent shift in Beijing’s policy toward Taiwan, but does suggest a new approach.
Correction: While Cheng was listed on the organization’s website as the president, he reportedly passed away in July 2015.
The Role of PLA Base 311 in Political Warfare against Taiwan (Part 3)
Elsa Kania is an analyst at the Long Term Strategy Group.
The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) utilizes techniques and methods associated with the “three warfares” to target Taiwan, particularly through the efforts of the former General Political Department’s (GPD) Base 311 (61716 部隊), its “Public Opinion Warfare, Psychological Warfare, and Legal Warfare Base” (輿論戰心理戰法律戰基地). Base 311, which has its headquarters in Fujian, within Fuzhou province, seemingly oversees at least six regiments that are responsible for engaging in the three warfares against Taiwan, including through multiple forms of propaganda.
While a comprehensive analysis of Base 311 would be beyond the scope of this article, an overview of its recent activities offers an illustration of its efforts to influence public opinion in Taiwan, including through associated proxy organizations, in peacetime. In a wartime scenario, Base 311’s engagement in the three warfares could be impacted by the PLA’s organizational reforms, which may enable increased coordination of these political warfare activities with information warfare.
Targeting Taiwan in Peacetime
In peacetime, Base 311’s employment of the three warfares has included the utilization of a commercial front, the China Huayi Broadcasting Corporation (中國華藝廣播公司, CHBC). Established in 1991, CHBC focuses on Taiwan-related content, including the Voice of the Taiwan Strait. CHBC describes itself as seeking to “promote Chinese culture” and emphasizes that, “cohering [凝聚] compatriots’ feelings” is the company’s abiding purpose. Its coverage of Taiwan is routinely negative, often highlighting political contention and social issues.
While there is relatively limited information available regarding the activities of Base 311 itself, CHBC maintains a much higher public profile, including through its involvement in multiple cross-Strait forums and exchanges. Typically, the commander of Base 311 is dual-hatted as the CEO (or chairman, 董事長) of CHBC. Major General Wang Shu (汪澍), who became the commander of Base 311 in 2010, was concurrently the chairman of CHBC. Since Wang Shu was promoted to become the director of the Nanjing Political Institute in 2015, there has been no official announcement regarding who would take over his role as commander of Base 311. However, since about mid-2015, Qiu Yu (邱雨) has been identified as the chairman of CHBC,[1] which may be an indication that he has taken on the role of commander of Base 311 as well. Since there is minimal information available about him under that name, he may also use a pseudonym to distinguish his PLA and CHBC personas.
In peacetime, CHBC’s attempts to influence public opinion have involved organizing cross-Strait exchanges, including the following, held within several months of each other in 2016:
- In August, CHBC was involved in organizing a cross-Strait college students’ exchange involving a community activities planning competition held in Fuzhou.
- In September, CHBC organized activities on “Sun Yat-sen thought” for students from elite Taiwanese universities that highlighted his commitment to national unification (国家统一) and national rejuvenation (民族振興).
- In November, CHBC, along with partners including the State Council Taiwan Affairs Office and the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait, organized a commemoration of the 150th anniversary of the birth of Sun Yat-sen that brought together youth delegates from Taiwan, Hong Kong, Macao, and mainland China.
- In his remarks, Qiu Yu (邱雨) called for promoting the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations and the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nationality (中華民族的偉大復興).
Beyond CHBC’s broadcasting and propaganda activities, Base 311 also appears to be linked to the Collaborative Innovation Center for the Peaceful Development of Cross-Strait Relations (兩岸關係和平發展協同創新中心). Ai Songru (艾松如), a psychological warfare specialist in the PLA, has been identified by multiple sources as CHBC’s Director and General Manager (董事、總經理), since at least 2011, under the pseudonym Ai Ke (艾克), seemingly to distinguish his PLA and CHBC activities.[2] Ai Songru has also been described as the executive director of the Collaborative Innovation Center for the Peaceful Development of Cross-Strait Relations. This center, established in 2012 at Xiamen University, has the objective and mandate “to promote the peaceful development of cross-strait relations and eventually reunify the nation.” In particular, it seeks to become “the most authoritative and influential source of information and scholarship on Taiwan studies in the world.”
These attempts to establish its authoritativeness and influence public opinion on Taiwan have included hosting a variety of events and exchanges related to issues in cross-Strait relations, including the Dajiang Forum; frequent publications in Chinese-language and English-language platforms; and participation in international conferences. Although its activities may appear relatively innocuous, the linkage of CICCSR to CHBC and thus to Base 311 indicates the intention to influence that underlies its engagement with Taiwanese and international audiences.
The Future of the Three Warfares in Wartime?
Looking forward, Base 311’s position and function within the PLA may evolve as a result of the ongoing organizational reforms. There are indications that Base 311, previously subordinate to the former GPD, may now be under the aegis of the PLA’s new Strategic Support Force (戰略支援部隊), based on a number of personnel transfers. Although there is not yet a definitive indication that this change has occurred, such a shift would be consistent with a broader pattern in which the majority of the four former General Departments’ operational units appear to have been transferred to the SSF.
The transfer of Base 311 to the SSF could reflect the PLA’s intensified focus on ensuring the operational impact of the three warfares in a warfighting context (see part 2). In practice, the conceptual framework of the three warfares is closely linked to the PLA’s strategic thinking on information warfare, which incorporates cyber warfare, electronic warfare, and also psychological warfare. In this regard, a potential organizational shift could prelude an enhanced focus on integrating the three warfares into information operations on the battlefield. In particular, the potential coordination of the PLA’s cyber and psychological warfare capabilities could enable more effective “cyber psychological warfare.”
At this point, it is unclear how and to what extent Base 311’s activities, including those of its front organizations, will continue to be coordinated with other key actors in the PLA’s political work/warfare system in the future. For instance, there are indications that Base 311 previously collaborated with or otherwise provided support to the former GPD Liaison Department (總政治部聯絡部), the Chinese Communist Party’s Taiwan Propaganda Leading Small Group, and also the Taiwan Affairs Leading Small Group, based on reports of interactions with figures from these organizations. Such collaborations will likely continue, but the coordination of these various political warfare activities could remain a challenge for the PLA.
Conclusion
The PLA’s efforts to target Taiwan in peacetime have involved extensive propaganda and also exchange activities organized by front organizations. In wartime, Base 311 would take on a much more active, combat-oriented function, in coordination with kinetic and information operations. Although the design of effective countermeasures against the three warfares could prove challenging, further attempts to enhance transparency regarding these activities and their underlying intentions may constitute an initial step toward undermining their efficacy.
The main point: Base 311 is a critical component of the PLA’s political warfare against Taiwan in peacetime that could take on a critical combat role in a conflict scenario.
[1] Within the same timeframe, Mei Huabo (梅华波) replaced Ying Hongwen (尹洪文), who was previously Base 311’s political commissar. See, for instance: Fuzhou Daily, July 29, 2015.
[2] See, for instance: CHBC, May 17, 2011; People’s Daily, May 18, 2015; CHBC, July 17, 2016.
History and Current Developments Regarding Taiwan’s Coast Guard Administration
Lyle J. Morris is a policy analyst at the nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND Corporation, where he focuses on Asia-Pacific security issues. The author would like to thank Logan Ma and Arthur Chan for research assistance for this article.
As countries of the Asia-Pacific develop policies to regulate large maritime zones of jurisdiction, the importance of coast guards as instruments of state policy has become increasingly important as a means of enforcing national maritime laws. Although the topic of coast guards has been dominated as of late by China’s massive coast guard expansion and its role in territorial disputes, the operations of smaller coast guards, such as the Taiwan Coast Guard Administration (CGA),[1] have received comparatively little attention. This article attempts to highlight the roles, force structure, and effectiveness of operations of the CGA.
The modern CGA was founded in 2000 with the integration of Taiwan’s Coast Guard Command and the Maritime Police and Customs into one civilian law enforcement agency. Like the United States Coast Guard, the CGA serves homeland security functions during peacetime and national defense missions during wartime. The CGA is under the administration of the Executive Yuan.
The top three missions of the CGA are: 1) the regulation of coastal zones under national jurisdiction, 2) the inspection of cargo entering and exiting ports, and 3) the investigation and seizure of smuggling operations and illegal vessels or people entering or exiting the country. Other missions include search and rescue, intelligence gathering, and support for maritime research and development.
The CGA is organized functionally across two directorates: a Maritime Patrol Directorate General (MPDG) (海洋巡防總局), responsible for far seas operations and patrols, and a Coastal Patrol Directorate General (CPDG) (海岸巡防總局), which patrols coastal waters, rivers, ports and bays. The CGA is organized regionally into Northern, Central, Southern and Eastern sectors, which cover the island of Taiwan proper (1,130 miles of coastline), as well as the waters surrounding the islands of Kinmen, Lienchiang (composed of Nangan and Dongying townships), Penghu, Pratas, and Taiping Island in the South China Sea. The total maritime area under Taiwanese jurisdiction covers over 335,000 square miles of exclusive economic zone (EEZ) waters.
According to CGA statistics, by the end 2015, the CGA had 13,061 personnel dispersed among the two directorate fleets. The MPDG is the CGA’s blue water fleet that must cover far sea maritime areas. Therefore, the MPDG has many of CGA’s largest cutters, such as the 3,000-ton Yilan class (CG-128) and Kaohsiung class (CG-128), both outfitted with helicopter landing pads and auto-cannons. The MPDG executes its mission with only 20 percent of total CGA personnel–about 2,550 officers. The bulk of the CGA is concentrated in the CPDG, with 10,222 personnel stationed across 13 patrol areas (巡防區), and dozens of brigades (岸巡大隊) and corps (巡總隊) units.
The total size of the CGA fleet is around 140 patrol and coastal vessels and is eight years into a 37 vessel, 24 billion NTD (US$ 782 million) shipbuilding program which will reportedly add 17,000 tons of capacity. When completed, the CGA will boast a total fleet size of 36,000 tons and 173 vessels.
Illegal fishing within Taiwan-administered waters—in particular cracking down on illegal fishing activities from the People’s Republic China (PRC) (as is happening in other parts of East Asia)—is an area of increasing emphasis for the CGA. These waters include Taiwan proper as well as the islands of Kinmen, Lienchiang, Penghu, and Pratas—territory claimed by the PRC but which the PRC does not actively contest. The only territory that Taiwan administers that could be considered “contested” is Taiping Island in the South China Sea, which is claimed by the PRC, the Philippines, and Vietnam. In other words, the illegal fishing that the CGA is attempting to neutralize appears to be occurring in largely uncontested maritime zones—the jurisdiction and laws over which are tacitly accepted by the PRC.
Starting in March 2012, the CGA initiated an aggressive campaign against illegal fisherman from the PRC called the “Clear Ocean Program” (碧海專案), which increased the number of investigations (查獲), expulsions and fines for fishing violations occurring within Taiwan-administered waters. The program appears to have been effective, as the number of illegal fishing inspections has gradually decreased over the past few years.
In 2015, for example, only 2,120 ships were inspected, of which 96 percent (2,035) were “expelled” (驅離) and 4 percent (85) were “detained” (扣留). This represented a decrease from an average of 5,110 inspections over the previous five years, according to CGA statistics. Most of the vessel detentions occurred near Kinmen, Lienchiang and Pratas islands, areas where 90 percent of fish stock has been depleted over the past 30 years.
Of the illegal fishing vessels inspected over the past five years, almost half (47.1 percent) were interdicted in waters off of Taiwan proper. The other half (43.5 percent) occurred off of Kinmen and the waters surrounding Lienchiang County—islands located only a few miles from mainland China. The other 10 percent occurred off Pratas and Taiping Island.
The size of vessels inspected range from 5-200 tons, with 100-200 ton vessels ranking first among all vessels seized in the past five years. 96.8 percent of these vessels came from the PRC, according to official CGA statistics.
Furthermore, between 2012 and 2015, fines against fishermen from the PRC increased substantially and peaked at 275 vessels in 2014, with fines averaging 175,100 NTD per vessel. The heavy fines and aggressive patrols seemingly had a deterrent effect, as only 78 vessels were fined in 2015.
The PRC is not the only country against which the CGA has stepped up operations. The CGA on occasion seeks to protect Taiwanese fishing and, in some cases, activists’ interests near the Japanese-administered Senkaku Islands. In the course of protecting a flotilla of Taiwanese activists attempting to assert sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands in 2012, the CGA reportedly “bumped into” Japanese Coast Guard vessels that were attempting to apprehend the activists. The CGA has also gotten into numerous skirmishes with Philippine Coast Guard and fishing vessels in the past. However, among illegal foreign activities in Taiwan-administered waters, Chinese fisherman represent the primary challenge to CGA authority and will likely remain so in the near future.
Finally, one mission of the CGA that has received relatively little attention is its jurisdiction over the disputed Taiping Island within the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea. In January 2000, the CGA replaced the Taiwan Marine Corps station in Taiping Island (with stations on Pratas and Kinmen Islands following suit), marking an important shift in administrative control from military to civilian personnel. The CGA also oversees biannual live-fire and search and rescue drills with the Taiwan Navy off Taiping and Pratas Islands to enhance interoperability and defense capabilities between the two services. The shift in command to the CGA reflects an understanding on the part of Taiwanese leaders that the South China Sea should be demilitarized.
The main point: The CGA is an increasingly effective constabulary force facilitating the protection and regulation of Taiwanese maritime rights and interests in the East and South China Sea.
[1] A breakdown of the Taiwan Coast Guard Agency fleet structure is available upon request. Source: Taiwan Coast Guard Administration (CGA) website. The author thanks Logan Ma for his assistance with this resource.
Prioritizing Taiwan’s Southbound Policy in Tourism: Enhancing the Domestic-International Nexus
By Alan H. Yang and Sherry Liu
Alan H. Yang is the Executive Director of the Center for Southeast Asian Studies at National Chengchi University in Taiwan.
Sherry Liu is the Research Associate and Project Coordinator, Center for Southeast Asian Studies, National Chengchi University, Taiwan
As part of the Tsai Ing-wen administration’s people-centered agenda, Taiwan has been actively promoting the New Southbound Policy. The policy aims, not only to expand Taiwan’s international space, but also to foster regional connectivity and people-to-people contacts. Since the Tsai administration took power in May 2016, Chinese tourism has fallen by over 36 percent. However, during the same period, the number of tourists from Japan rose 17 percent, and the number of tourists coming from South Korea increased by 30 percent. One of the significant measures taken to boost tourism has been to facilitate and attract travelers from ASEAN countries, especially the emerging middle classes, in order to build connections with South and Southeast Asia, Australia, and New Zealand.
Reinventing New Southbound Tourism Project
In order to promote the New Southbound Policy in tourism, Taiwan adopted new initiatives to improve multi-sectoral capacities. On the public front, Taiwan’s Foreign Ministry has eased visa requirements and increased visa exemptions for selected Southeast Asian countries. The visa-free process was already in place for Singapore, Malaysia, Brunei and Thailand. The project will extend to Indonesia (2017), India and the Philippines (2018), as well as Myanmar, Laos, and Cambodia (2019). This initiative has received positive responses from neighboring countries, benefiting ASEAN citizens most.
Additionally, Taiwan’s Executive Yuan (EY) is encouraging local authorities to host travel fairs in Southeast Asia. To attract potential visitors to Taiwan, these exhibitions display local attractions in the categories of culture, arts and crafts, lifestyle, and cuisine, and strengthen Taiwan’s image in the region. In line with tourism promotion, the government is also providing a training program for Southeast Asian immigrants (新住民) in selected localities. By encouraging them to use their linguistic and cultural talents, the new immigrants may act as important conduits for developing tourism and help build a tourism-friendly environment.
Going forward, the role of the private sector, or Taishang (Taiwanese businesses, 臺商), is also important. They are encouraged to promote Taiwan as an annual travel destination. To this end, the government is offering charter flights and travel rewards as incentives to seek buy-in from businesses. Tapping further into Southeast Asian market, more multilingual information will be provided on tourist attractions in Taiwan. Halal food and Muslim-friendly restaurants and hotels are also proliferating, showing an expanded social understanding of Southeast Asia and strengthening linkages within the region and to the Muslim culture.
Increasing ASEAN Touristm, Enhancing People-to-People Contacts
Admittedly, Taiwan diversified its tourism market to counter plummeting Chinese tourist numbers. According to Taiwan’s Tourism Bureau, there was a prominent increase in Southeast Asian visitors between January and November of 2016. Tourists coming from Cambodia increased 85.4 percent to 3,111 visitors, followed by Thailand with 52.1 percent and 164,201 visitors, Brunei with a 51.2 percent increase and 3,795 visitors, and India with 38.2 percent and 30,986 visitors. The total number of travelers to Taiwan in the same period increased by 2.5 percent and tourist arrivals from Southeast Asia grew 14.2 percent that year.
While the number of travelers arriving in Taiwan has grown considerably, it is in part because the base is low and therefore it is necessary to continue enticing Southeast Asian tourists while carefully examining the individual figures. It is important to note that the implementation of the New Southbound Policy in tourism is not entirely a response to the short-term impact of declining numbers of Chinese tourists. Instead, it is part of a long-term strategy to reinvigorate Taiwan’s domestic tourism industry and to develop a friendlier environment for a diversity of foreign visitors.
Governmental sectors are keen to revise immigration regulations and improve migrant laborers’ welfare. On October 21, 2016, the Legislative Yuan (LY) introduced the amendments to Employment Service Act and Nationality Law, eliminating unreasonable brokerage fees. The Ministry of Education also provides an empowerment program for Southeast Asian immigrants, and listed Southeast Asian languages as required courses in Taiwanese schools from 2018 onward. Evidently, cross-sectoral collaboration is necessary for Taiwan to align more closely with the regional community. Communication with Southeast Asian countries and societies is expected to occur, in order to foster consensus on future cooperation, and this will simultaneously promote Taiwan’s international engagement.
A Successful New Southbound Policy, A Better Taiwan
On December 14, 2016, the Executive Yuan unveiled the New Southbound Policy Work Plan. Measures detailed in the work plan to attract more visitors from Southeast Asia are: easing visa barriers; diversifying the tourism market; improving the environment for tourism; and highlighting the relationship indigenous peoples in Taiwan and Austronesians to establish a historical and cultural link to Southeast Asian ethnic groups.
To further illustrate, the Executive Yuan is utilizing a network of stakeholders that includes Taiwan businesses, students from Southeast Asia, and local governments and civilian associations, to jointly promote Taiwan’s diverse culture and soft power.
The government also seeks to set up a tourism office in Southeast Asia—for example, in Bangkok, Thailand. The office could serve as a platform for promoting travel to Taiwan. Taiwan hopes to attract more than 2.2 million tourists from Southeast Asia by 2019. The number may seem small, as it is equivalent to only 54 percent of the number of tourists who came from China in 2015. However, successfully meeting the benchmark would demonstrate the social and political commitment to domestic economic reform. It is a policy that aims to build a better Taiwan.
The New Southbound Policy’s emphasis is on a people-centric agenda. The goal is to serve the mutual benefits of Taiwan and Southeast Asian countries. By cementing mutual cooperation and developing relations with regional counterparts, Taiwan is reinventing itself, in order to be incorporated into the regional community. In other words, the New Southbound Policy can be be seen as a strategic trigger to enhance Taiwan’s global influence and to promote Taiwan’s national development. It is the locus of Taiwan’s effort to enhance better engagement with neighboring countries, and to sustain the momentum of ongoing regional integration.
The main point: Taiwan’s strategy to diversify its tourism sector and attract more visitors from Southeast Asia is part of a larger foreign policy plan called the New Southbound Policy which seeks to increase Taiwan’s regional integration.
