The Global Taiwan Brief Volume 3, Issue 15

Fortnightly Review
By: Russell Hsiao

Taiwan’s Multifaceted International Engagements
By: David An

US-China Military “Tipping Points”: Implications for Taiwan (Part II)
By: Christopher Yung

Why Beijing is Failing to Win Hearts and Minds of the Taiwanese People
By: Ariel Pei-Hsuan Chiang

---

Fortnightly Review

By: Russell Hsiao

Russell Hsiao is the executive director of the Global Taiwan Institute and the editor-in-chief of the Global Taiwan Brief.

Senior US Defense Official Reaffirms Reagan’s Assurances to Taiwan

As China intensifies its pressure campaign against Taiwan, the Trump Administration reaffirmed US commitment to Taiwan’s defense and security. At an international conference focused on cross-Strait relations held in Washington DC, US Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asia and Pacific Security Affairs, Randall Schriver, confirmed President Ronald Reagan’s assurances to Taiwan as a cornerstone of US policy towards the island. In his wide-ranging speech that covered Taiwan’s role as a “valuable partner” in the Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy to US-China relations, the senior defense official stated that US policy towards Taiwan is based on the “Taiwan Relations Act, Six Assurances, [and] other foundational documents, and we [the United States] will continue to honor those and implement those in a consistent way.”

The first set and most famously known assurances, which were delivered in 1982 by the Director of the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) Director James R. Lilley, had six key elements:

(1) “… [w]e did not agree to set a date certain for ending arms sales to Taiwan”;

(2) “… [w]e see no mediation role for the United States” between Taiwan and the PRC;

(3) “… [n]or will we attempt to exert pressure on Taiwan to enter into negotiations with the PRC”;

(4) “… [t]here has been no change in our longstanding position on the issue of sovereignty over Taiwan”;

(5) “[w]e have no plans to seek” revisions to the Taiwan Relations Act; and

(6) the August 17 Communiqué “should not be read to imply that we have agreed to engage in prior consultations with Beijing on arms sales to Taiwan.”

The Six Assurances, as it became known, is not law and is non-binding on the Executive branch. Yet, it has been a long-standing declaratory statement of policy made by successive administrations to affirm its intention on how it will conduct policy towards the Taiwan Strait. Whether the Executive branch is committed to adhering to the Six Assurances had become a contentious issue at Congressional hearings on Taiwan policy, especially in the previous administration. Noting its intermittent absence in official policy statements, the US House of Representatives introduced H. Con. Res. 88, and in 2016 the US Senate unanimously passed concurrent resolution S. Con. Res. 38 that “affirms that the Taiwan Relations Act and the Six Assurances are both cornerstones of United States relations with Taiwan.”

While the importance of the Six Assurances as a guide for Taiwan policy cannot be understated in this uncertain environment, the full weight of President Reagan’s assurances must be read in its totality with two other “non-papers” conveyed on July 26, 1982, and August 17, 1982. These “non-papers,” include the core connotation “that any resolution of these [cross-Strait] issues be accomplished peacefully” and committed that the United States “will do nothing to jeopardize the ability of the people of Taiwan to deal with this matter in their own way.” Most importantly, that any further concessions to Beijing must be “predicated on one thing: that is, that the PRC will continue to advocate only to use peaceful means to settle the Taiwan issue.”

It is within this context that the significance of Reagan’s Assurances and its reaffirmation made by a senior Pentagon official in the Trump Administration come to light. To be sure, some US scholars have recommended for the US government to rescind the Six Assurances in order to reach a modus vivendi with China. To this point, albeit indirectly, Schriver emphasized that the administration wanted US-China relations to be based on a “foundation of objective reality.” This statement tracks with the extraordinarily clear assessment made by the deputy assistant director at CIA’s East Asia mission center, Michael Collins, at another recent conference, in which the CIA official stated: “The Chinese fundamentally seek to replace the United States as the leading power in the world … [by] this rising China, under this leadership, directed by this Communist Party of China … I would argue … that what they’re waging against us is fundamentally a cold war—a cold war not like we saw during the Cold War, but a cold war by definition.”

While warning Beijing that its recent actions are inconsistent with its commitment to resolving the cross-Strait dispute by peaceful means, Schriver noted—consistent with Reagan’s assurances—that China can impact things if they behave in a more constructive and peaceful way. The assistant secretary made clear that “[s]o much of what we [the United States] will do is based on what the PRC does, and what the PLA does in terms of that relationship …. [a]s China increases its pressure, increases their capabilities, put systems across the Taiwan Strait, that will impact … how we approach the security assistance relationship with Taiwan.” In response to a reporter’s question about the heightened chance of miscalculation and conflict between the United States and China in the Taiwan Strait, the assistant secretary replied: “What would be most helpful is if China renounced the use of force [against Taiwan], and began to pull back the military means they are using to intimidate and coerce the people of Taiwan, and that would be a great step to reduce risk and the chance of accident or conflict.” The Trump Administration appears to be taking President Reagan’s lead on Taiwan policy.

The main point: Against the backdrop of China’s intensifying pressure campaign against Taiwan, the Trump Administration’s affirmed President Reagan’s assurances to Taiwan.

 

The Tsai Administration Commits to Maintaining “Status Quo” in the Taiwan Strait

The new minister of Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council (MAC)—a cabinet-level agency in charge of implementing the Tsai Ing-wen administration’s cross-Strait policy—was in Washington DC last week to meet with senior US officials and the policy community to discuss relations across the Taiwan Strait. To be sure, the cross-Strait situation has changed considerably in the three years since a MAC minister last visited the nation’s capital back in 2015. As part of his visit, MAC Minister Chen Ming-tong (陳明通) delivered a public speech on July 18 near Capitol Hill that re-emphasized the Tsai Administration’s intent to maintain the “status quo” in the Taiwan Strait.

Specifically, Minister Chen stated that the Tsai administration’s position on cross-Strait relations remains “in accordance with the ROC Constitution, the Act Governing Relations between the People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area, and other relevant legislation. She [President Tsai] has also respected the historical fact of the cross-Strait talks in 1992.” The senior Taiwanese official’s reaffirmation of the government’s consistent line in cross-Strait policy comes amid growing pressure on the Tsai administration, both internally and externally, from the opposition as well as from more hardline elements within her own party, and as China intensifies its pressure campaign against Taiwan. The minister sought US support to “convey to the Mainland the importance of maintaining the status quo, peace, and stability across the Taiwan Strait, and urge the Mainland to be rational, show goodwill, and stop affecting security and stability in the Asia-Pacific region by unilaterally undermining the cross-Strait status quo.”

On the same day of the minister’s public speech, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) began conducting live-fire exercises in the East China Sea, which lasted through July 23, in an area that was reportedly similar in size to Taiwan. According to the hawkish Chinese tabloid Global Times, which is affiliated with the Party’s mouthpiece People’s Daily, the exercise is intended to send a strong warning to “Taiwan separatists.” A Chinese defense commentator cited in the article stated that “[t]he PLA Air Force and Navy have been frequently conducting island encirclement exercises. The drill this time will add up and form a military deterrence of high pressure against the Taiwan separatists.”

Despite the Tsai administration’s appeal for peace, Minister Chen noted that “the ROC will never relinquish sovereignty in exchange for an illusory peace. Nor will the 23 million people of democratic Taiwan ever allow their destiny to be decided under the non-democratic system of the other side.” A statement that appeared to be a veiled critique of the conciliatory policies of the previous Ma administration towards China, even as Chinese military capabilities and threat continued to grow under its watch.

The MAC minister’s commitment to maintain the “status quo” in the Taiwan Strait was reinforced by Taiwan’s Minister of Foreign Affairs in an interview with CNN, in which Foreign Minister Joseph Wu stated that “[w]e [Taiwan] want to maintain peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait … By itself, Taiwan exists outside China, Taiwan exists by itself, so there’s no need for Taiwan to go beyond what it is right now.” Contrary to the assessments of some analysts who see the United States as unreliable or believe that US support for Taiwan is provoking China at Taipei’s peril, Taiwan’s Foreign Minister stated: “What we are concerned about is that the US does not support Taiwan anymore,” he said. “If the security ties between Taiwan and the US are getting stronger and strengthening our ties, then that would become a barrier for the Chinese to think about future military scenarios against Taiwan,” Foreign Minister Wu added.

Not mincing words, Minister Chen pointed out that “Beijing’s long denial of the existence of the ROC has prevented resolution of the political impasse across the Taiwan Strait.” This statement echoes President Tsai’s previous call on Beijing “to face up to the reality that the Republic of China exists.” As noted in a recent congressional testimony by former Pentagon official and executive director of the Project 2049 Institute, Lt. Col. (ret.) Mark Stokes: “The objective reality is that Taiwan, under its current ROC constitution, exists as an independent, sovereign state. In 1979, the US withdrew diplomatic recognition. The shift in recognition was and is a matter of policy and political expediency. The ROC (Taiwan) did not cease to exist.”

The MAC minister’s visit to DC coincided with a large bi-partisan delegation of lawmakers visiting from Taiwan. However, this flurry of engagements between Taiwan and its most important security partner the United States occurred on the heels of another high-profile meeting between former KMT chairman Lien Chan (連戰) and CCP Chairman Xi Jinping that took place in Beijing on July 13. In a meeting that some analysts described as striking a more moderate tone, Xi stated that “We [the CPP] have the confidence and ability to keep a firm hold on the correct direction, work for the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations, and advance the process toward the peaceful reunification of China.” The timing of the meeting appears to suggest that Xi may be seeking to prop up the KMT as its only counterpart for cross-Strait dialogue as high-level governmental exchanges between the ruling DPP and the CCP remain frozen.

According to China Network Television, Xi issued four “unwavering” (堅定不移) promises: 1) unwavering adherence to the so-called “1992 consensus” and opposition to Taiwan independence; 2) unwavering expansion and deepening of cross-Strait exchanges; 3) unwavering work for the benefit of compatriots on both sides of the Strait; and 4) unwavering efforts to unite the compatriots on both sides of the Strait to work together for national rejuvenation.

The main point: Despite facing growing pressure both internally and externally, the Tsai administration has recommitted to maintaining the “status quo” in the Taiwan Strait.

 

Taiwan’s Multifaceted International Engagements

By: David An

David An is a senior research fellow at the Global Taiwan Institute and was previously a political-military officer at the US Department of State. 

In the wake of severed diplomatic ties between Taiwan and Burkina Faso, Panama, and São Tomé and Príncipe, Taipei has stepped up its international engagement with the world in various new ways. This article provides a detailed analysis of Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affair’s (MOFA) public news releases and its activities in areas such as conducting legislative delegation visits, issuing official statements thanking other countries for their support of Taiwan, and new areas of cooperation such as visa waivers and trade pacts. Additionally, Taiwan’s MOFA has also significantly increased international engagement through international think tank exchanges, art exhibitions, and academic visits of foreign scholars to Taiwan [1]. These are the many specific ways that the Tsai Ing-wen Administration is improving Taiwan’s international engagement and enhancing other countries’ support for Taiwan despite the loss of four official diplomatic allies since May 2016.

Top Foreign Ministry engagement: Legislative visits, visa waivers, trade pacts, expressing appreciation

Among the various activities undertaken by the Tsai Administration, foreign legislative visits to Taiwan have increased the most at over 80 percent in the first two years compared to the last two years of the previous administration. As examples, Taiwan received the following legislative groups in the months of May and June:

• 11-member delegation of Greek members of Parliament
• Delegation led by the chair of the Latvian Parliament’s Public Health Subcommittee
• Delegation led by a French National Assembly member
• Slovak National Council delegation
• Delegation led by the chair of Czech Senate Committee on Health and Social Policy
• US Senator Cory Gardner, Chairman of Foreign Relations Subcommittee on East Asia, the Pacific, and International Cybersecurity
• Delegation from the German Parliament

Figure 1: Top aspects of Taiwan’s Foreign Ministry engagement

It is easier for senators and congressmen from the United States and other liberal democracies to visit Taiwan as members of the legislative branch due to the separation of powers in liberal democracies. Legislators, representing local governments, are free to formulate their international affairs policies at the local level, and it is therefore a simpler matter to visit Taiwan than senior members of the Executive branch of government such as the White House, US State Department, or Pentagon.

The highest profile congressional delegations to visit Taiwan over the past two years came from the United States, the UK, Germany, France, and the European Parliament:

• US Senator Cory Gardner (R-CO) visited Taiwan recently on May 26
• Lord Faulkner of Worcester, Deputy Speaker of UK House of Lords visited Taiwan on January 29
• Two German Bundestag members also visited Taiwan on November 28, 2017, but they are listed anonymously on the MOFA news website
• France’s Senator Cyril Pellevat led a delegation of French senators to Taiwan on August 29, 2017
• UK Member of Parliament Andrew Rosindell led a parliamentary delegation to Taiwan on August 3, 2017
• Member of the European Parliament Anna Fotyga, Chair of the European Parliament Subcommittee on Security and Defense visited Taiwan on May 19, 2017

While these legislative visits are not made by heads of foreign ministries or heads of state since typically only heads of state of Taiwan’s diplomatic allies will visit Taiwan, they are nonetheless important engagement with prominent political leaders in leading countries.

Taiwan’s official statements thanking others for international support have risen three-fold compared to the previous administration. Taiwan officials expressed appreciation multiple times to US congressmen, members of the European Parliament, Canada, and Japan throughout May for publicly supporting Taiwan’s attempts to participate in the World Health Assembly. That same month, Taiwan also thanked US Congressmen for condemning pressure from China to alter references to Taiwan, such as on governments’, airlines’ and hotel’s websites. Taiwan also thanked the international community multiple times on February 7, 8, 9, and 13 for their support in the aftermath of the Hualien earthquake in Taiwan. In September 2017, Taiwan officially thanked its diplomatic allies for speaking up for Taiwan in the United Nations General Assembly. In November 2016, Taiwan’s MOFA thanked 97 German parliamentarians for support of Taiwan’s participation in the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO).

Taiwan has expressed appreciation for international support since it has become more diplomatically isolated over the past two years than under the previous administration.

Taiwan’s other major types of international cooperation are its greater numbers of visa waiver programs and trade, which have risen over 20 percent. Taiwan’s MOFA recently announced its decision on July 12 to extend its 14-day visa-free entry program for Brunei, Philippine, and Thai nationals for at least another year. Over the past two years, other notable visa waiver programs include:

• Visa-free treatment of 10 Latin American and Caribbean countries
• eVisa scheme to businesspeople from Iran and six South Asian nations
• Easing of visa rules for countries part of the New Southbound Policy
• Taxation agreement with Poland
• Air services agreement and memorandum of understanding on agricultural cooperation with India

However, Figure 1 shows how the previous administration also made substantial gains in visa waiver programs and trade pacts, though the Tsai Administration has been even more focused on this effort.

Other significant Foreign Ministry engagement: think tank / academic visits and cultural exhibitions

Taiwan has stepped up engagements with international affairs think tanks and academics in other countries by inviting them to attend conferences in Taiwan. The blue columns and the yellow columns in Figure 2 show how think tank engagement and academic engagement respectively have become much more prominent in the past two years than in the prior period. Throughout Tsai’s term so far, Taiwan received visits from this sample of key individuals and groups representing high profile universities and think tanks since May 2016:

• Czech Academy of Sciences President Eva Zažímalová
• Dr. Alim-Louis Benabid of French biomedical research center Clinatec
• Dr. Dede Rosyada, Rector of Indonesia’s Universitas Islam Negeri Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta
• Three-member delegation of the German Research Center for Geosciences
• Five-member delegation of other German researchers
• Foreign Minister Wu conferred Grand Medal of Diplomacy upon Heritage Foundation founder Dr. Edwin Feulner

Figure 2: Moderate areas of Taiwan MOFA engagement

Starting in early 2017, Taiwan started to more prominently utilize cultural activities such as art exhibitions to raise Taiwan’s international profile. In April 2017, Taiwan launched a photography exhibition entitled: “Leave No One Behind: World Health Security Needs Taiwan, Taiwan Needs the WHO.” Later in October 2017, Taiwan launched modern art exhibits in Singapore, New York, and Washington, DC showcasing Taiwan’s artistic talent.

While news headlines that grab public attention show Taiwan losing one diplomatic ally after another, there is another story of Taiwan’s grit. MOFA’s official news releases show Taiwan’s renewed determination to make gains in areas outside of formal diplomatic alliances. The analysis contained in this article makes sense of Taiwan’s Foreign Ministry data to more clearly show how Taiwan is channeling its effort to boost its ties with foreign legislators and academics. The data shows that Taiwan is more actively bringing businessmen, tourists, and students into Taiwan through visa waiver programs and trade pacts. It is also drawing the attention of the general populace through cultural events. All of these activities reveal Taiwan’s persistence in the face of strong adversity.

The main point: In the wake of Taiwan losing one after another of its diplomatic allies, Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs has drastically increased foreign legislative visits to Taiwan, visa waiver programs, trade pacts, and formal statements expressing appreciation for international support; but has also increased international affairs think tank activities, academic exchanges, and cultural activities such as international art exhibitions.

---

[1] As also mentioned in my previous GTB article, there are many caveats to this quick analysis fit for a short Global Taiwan Brief article rather than a lengthy and thorough occasional report. The information is self-reported by Taiwan MOFA so it does not capture all engagement that occurred, only all of the engagement listed on the MOFA website. In addition, my previous article on the MOFA’s overall efforts visualized the complete data set in one chart to show that these top and moderate areas of engagement are representative of the actual data, and not cherry-picking favorable points.

 

US-China Military “Tipping Points”: Implications for Taiwan (Part II)

By: Christopher Yung

Christopher Yung is the Donald Bren Chair of Non-Western Strategic Thought at Marine Corps University, where he serves as Director and Professor of East Asian Studies. He is the author, editor, and contributor to numerous books, monographs, and articles on Chinese strategy.

A Western interpretation of the models and the analysis presented in part I of this series on assessing “tipping points” would conclude that within two to three decades China will be in a position to engage in large-scale regional conflict with the United States, and therefore the United States would either have to be prepared to engage in that conflict or simply accept the inevitable and negotiate its withdrawal from the Indo-Asia-Pacific region.

The same can be said for Taiwan. The tipping point then is sometime between the years 2030 and 2050 when these material developments are supposed to have become reality. This decision calculus conforms to a Western strategic perspective which posits that military capabilities dictate strategies, but they also dictate likely outcomes and therefore are highly suggestive of likely future political choices left to the parties involved. Prussian general and military theorist Carl von Clausewitz’s famous dictum “that war is an extension of politics by other means” is followed by a less well-known dictum, which says that militaries are best used to eliminate the armies of one’s adversary so that the state can impose its political will on the adversary. The West then is much more focused on the relative military capabilities of competing states. Western strategists are much more inclined to believe that relative material capabilities dictate future realities and are therefore inclined to believe that it is possible to tangibly identify when these realities have changed; hence, Westerners are much more inclined to believe they can measure, assess, and identify tipping points.  

The Cultural and Political Dimensions of Tipping Points

While Mao, a central figure still today in Chinese formulation of strategy, recognized the importance of relative military capabilities to the formulation of strategy, he was no adherent to material determinism. For Mao, the human dimension of strategic interactions should be front and center. China has no intention of pushing for a large-scale regional or systemic conflict with the United States. It seeks to gain its strategic objectives with a minimum amount of collateral damage to the international economy, the international system, and to China’s domestic economy and internal stability. It is more likely that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership will take advantage of these projected material developments, these shifts in the military balance, to exert as much coercive pressure on all of the parties to this strategic situation, while seeking to avoid direct confrontation and conflict with the United States. This does not sound like a fait accompli, it sounds like iterative strategic gamesmanship. In other words, a missing component in an analysis focused solely on material elements is human agency and stratagem.

The best most recent example of this East-meets-West strategic interaction is the Vietnam War. By all accounts the United States defense establishment under Robert McNamara had all of the material, military capability, and raw power advantages over Vietnam and its Communist allies. A tipping point would already have been achieved by the mid-1960s when US troop levels had approached half a million personnel in Indochina and more than adequate air, naval, and ground combat equipment in theater. Even after the United States and its Communist adversaries started clashing, McNamara and his “whiz kids” were presenting rosy reports to President Lyndon Johnson that they would win the war because they were “winning the battle of body counts.” A tipping point had easily been reached and the United States could expect victory. What Johnson and McNamara did not sufficiently take into account was the impact of human agency and stratagem in this strategic interaction. They did not take into account that the North Vietnamese would be willing to take over half a million killed; they did not take into account the corrosive effects of Vietcong activities in the South Vietnamese villages and how Communist political strategy was undermining the South Vietnamese ability to effectively govern; they did not take into account a clever one-two punch strategy that the enemy employed in which the US military forces on the ground had to contend both with an insurgency and a conventional threat that could easily penetrate into South Vietnam at a time and place of the enemy’s choosing. In short, US strategists could envisage all the favorable tipping points they wanted, but the reality did not match the conceptualization because the enemy “had a vote” and he voted not to recognize that a tipping point had arrived in America’s favor.

In general, future strategic interactions between China, the United States, and Taiwan are faced with an analogous situation. Are the United States and its allies motivated to take on China under trying circumstances, to include putting troops on Taiwan in case of a PLA attack on the island? Is the United States willing to go up the escalation ladder? What if the US is able to rally not just its Asia-Pacific allies, but its allies in NATO, who have demonstrated an interest in the security of the Asia Pacific, and have also become involved?  What if India, concerned over developments in the Indo-Asia-Pacific, also becomes involved as well? Could the US pursue a regional conflict strategy of “Active Denial” in which it would rally countries of the region to deny China access to bases/facilities, strategic passages and airspace as suggested by some analysts?

These developments alone radically change Beijing’s calculus for how a Taiwan campaign develops. If China has fielded an overwhelming force that has the potential to not only blockade Taiwan, but also to invade it, does the fact that Taiwan has developed a “porcupine strategy” whereby its special forces take to the hills and tie down PLA troops for months, change Beijing’s calculus on whether it should or should not invade? In short, the potential strategic choices of the United States, Taiwan, American allies in the Pacific, other interested strategic actors, and China’s calculus of both its external and internal security requirements ultimately determine countless future tipping points. When taking into account the human dimension of strategy and the potential of stratagems to confound Chinese strategic objectives, then identifying actual tipping points becomes a much more difficult task.

This entire discussion over tipping points reminds one of the intellectual debate over the balance of power. It can be empirically tested and measured, but a balance and/or an imbalance really comes down to the “eye of the beholder.” The analysis that most strategists have undertaken is straightforward: Material trends are troubling. They show that by mid-century China may have a $40 trillion dollar economy and a military to match. They show that when hypothetical tactical interactions between the US and China take place near the Taiwan Strait, the advantages enjoyed by the US military may have eroded. They show that even now China may possess the capability to shut down key parts of Taiwan’s ability to defend itself. These developments suggest that China is likely to become more coercive and to be less accommodating to US interests and concerns. They show that the Chinese Communist leadership may be less willing to talk with Taiwan’s political leadership to work out problems between the two. In that sense, Beijing may perceive that its capabilities have arrived at a tipping point and therefore we can expect a much tougher Chinese approach to Taiwan affairs. At the same time, it is also the case that tipping points are much more difficult to measure and to assess than strategists claim.

Some “China Hands” are probably correct when they point out that historically Chinese strategists from Sun Tzu to Mao have paid close attention to the fact that human agency, strategy formulation, and the effects of successful statesmanship can significantly determine outcomes. It is with this in mind that the United States, Taiwan, and America’s allies in the Asia-Pacific should think about its future strategies to preserve the balance in East Asia and peace across the Taiwan Strait.    

The main point:  When left to assess the US-China or PRC-Taiwan strategic situation solely through material comparisons it is possible to roughly predict that some kind of tipping point will be reached between the years 2030 and 2050. However, history has shown that material factors only represent a part of the strategic equation. Thus, the actual expected outcomes of strategic interactions between China, the United States, and Taiwan come down to the effectiveness of the policies and strategies put forward by the United States and its allies, the willingness of the United States and Taiwan to take bold, innovative actions to counter Chinese actions, and the willingness of America’s allies in the region and outside of it to cooperate for the sake of collective security in the region.  

 

Why Beijing is Failing to Win Hearts and Minds of the Taiwanese People

By: Ariel Pei-Hsuan Chiang

Ariel Pei-Hsuan Chiang is a former intern at the Global Taiwan Institute and currently a MA candidate at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, concentrating on Conflict Management and minoring in China Studies.

Beijing is failing to win the hearts and minds of the Taiwanese people. Threatening to use force does not benefit the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) Taiwan policies and its current approach for unification has created more antipathy towards China in Taiwanese society. The reason why China has failed in winning the Taiwanese hearts and minds is simple: China does not take Taiwanese people’s nationalistic sentiment into consideration. Moreover, China’s current strategy alienates the Taiwanese people by making China appear hostile, untrustworthy, and manipulative. An independent poll conducted by Global Views Monthly in February 2018 shows that only 30.3 percent of people in Taiwan perceive China as friendly, which is a 9 percentage point decrease of the same poll released in 2008. Another poll conducted in March 2018 also shows that 57 percent of Taiwanese people hold negative impressions toward the Chinese government compared to only 22 percent who have a positive impression.  

China’s extreme political tactics

China is increasing its pressure on Taiwan through measures short of war in the hopes of achieving their objective of eliminating Taiwanese independence sentiments. Its manipulative tactics include a combination of military threats, cultural and historical pandering, diplomatic and economic coercion. Some of these strategies are more useful than others. Some are positive, and some are negative.

The Anti-Secession Law (反分裂國家法) passed in 2005 by Beijing is viewed by Taiwanese people as a military threat and a negative approach since it states that if Taiwan’s secession from China becomes a fact, “or that major incidents entailing Taiwan’s secession from China should occur, or that possibilities for a peaceful reunification should be completely exhausted, the state shall employ non-peaceful means.” To many Chinese people and officials, the Anti-Secession Law reduces the possibility of war and promotes exchanges and stability, whereas Taiwanese view it as a brazen threat of war and “in fact a law that authorizes war.”

In terms of cultural and historical pandering, a more neutral approach is how China tries to emphasize shared history, cultures, and ties of blood in an attempt to attract possible sympathizers. However, China seems to prefer negative approaches such as marginalizing Taiwan’s international participation, forcing foreign countries and private companies to toe its “One-China Principle” by listing Taiwan as a region or a province of China. At the same time, China utilizes Taiwan’s economic dependency to hurt Taiwan by limiting Chinese tourists when it deems necessary. Beijing also implements preferential policies to lure talented Taiwanese to work in the region, both for its domestic industrial development and to cause a brain drain in Taiwan. The mixture of positive and negative approaches are counterproductive to the goal of bringing Taiwan closer to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) either politically or emotionally.

China takes an inconsistent approach

China’s current approach is inconsistent with its previously affirmative approach towards Taiwan adopted during the Ma Ying-jeou administration, which preceded the current one. For example, the governments from both sides of the Strait resumed direct flights between China and Taiwan in 2008, for the first time in 60 years. Another agreement on tourism boosted the number of Chinese tourists visiting Taiwan 45 times in the first year, giving the economy a much-needed boost. However, even during this period of cooperation, Taiwanese people felt threatened by China as the PRC’s military threat continued to grow unabated. When Taiwan’s government failed to consider Taiwanese public opinion in passing the cross-Strait Trade and Services Agreement, the student-led Sunflower Movement emerged in the spring of 2014.

After the Nationalist Party (KMT) lost the presidential election and the majority of the parliament in 2016, the Chinese government exacerbated its mixed approach towards Taiwan. On one hand, China offered Taiwanese incentives and promised equal, if not preferential treatment; on the other hand, they showed hostility by sending fighter jets to fly closely to Taiwan and reaffirm the possibility to resort to force. The stark difference between the current and previous administrations highlights China’s lack of respect to the Taiwanese people’s decision to elect Tsai Ing-wen as their President. This “good cop, bad cop” tactic does not fulfill the Chinese goals, but only inflames the suspicions and hostilities of people in Taiwan toward China.

China is trying to influence the Taiwan government’s behavior, but this manipulative approach does not improve the Taiwanese people’s perception of China. Traditional diplomacy tends to see the ongoing disputes across the Taiwan Strait as driven by material interests, but this approach ignores the psychological factors that create deep animosities rooted in a perceived threat to identity and survival. Thus, while coercion and threat may alter behavior sometimes, they would never change perception. Taiwan has done a lot to maintain the status quo and extend an olive branch to China, calling for developing “benign interactions through constructive communication without preconditions.” China, on the other hand, chooses to alter the status quo of the Taiwan Strait negatively and unilaterally.

Taiwan’s responds by further committing to the status quo

Beijing’s erratic and inconsistent approach undermines the government’s credibility and makes the people of Taiwan more suspicious of China’s intentions towards Taiwan even if they were to return to an affirmative approach eventually. As distrust deepens, Taiwanese people will only resist unification with China more. According to a recent survey, 70 percent of Taiwanese believe democracy is the only sustainable option, especially for the younger generation who has the lowest preference for authoritarian regimes as a model in contrast to their peers in Europe and the United States. With China becoming more authoritarian under Xi Jinping, Taiwanese people will only feel more distant and distasteful to the regime.

Taiwanese people are for the most part committed to the status quo, yet as the above mentioned survey shows, over 70 percent of Taiwanese are willing to defend Taiwan in the face of Chinese invasion. However, as China becomes more powerful and more confident, it is gradually leaving Taiwan no space to be vague about unification internationally. Between May 2016 and 2018, China poached four of Taiwan’s diplomatic allies, even as it continues to hold out the “one country, two systems” (一國兩制) as the model for unification.

Hong Kong as a negative lesson

Hong Kong is case in point of the dangers of accepting Beijing’s “one country, two systems”. Hong Kong was promised a high degree of autonomy, universal suffrage, human rights, and the rule of law in the Joint Declaration and the 1990 Hong Kong Basic Law. Yet, the Chinese government’s betrayal of its promises to Hong Kong under “one country, two system” and the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ claim in 2017 that “the joint declaration with Britain over Hong Kong, which laid the blueprint over how the city would be ruled after its return to China in 1997, was a historical document that no longer had any practical significance” sent a chilling message to Taiwanese people that whatever promises China makes, they can be taken away arbitrarily.

Conclusion

China must sincerely consider the psychological effects of its actions within Taiwan and in the international space. Furthermore, it must accept and respect the fact that Taiwan has a different culture and identity from China. These approaches toward Taiwan have to be consistent and positive in order to gain the trust of the Taiwanese people. By doing so, the conflict can be shifted gradually away from a mentality of identity survival, expanding the zone of possible agreement. If a “great power” (大國) like China cannot be magnanimous and broad-minded enough to search for common ground with Taiwan, the disputes will never end and a war in the Taiwan Strait may erupt. This unintended conflict will shatter the prosperity and stability of the region and the world.

The main point: The PRC’s current approach toward Taiwan, sending mixed messages with positive and negative measures, does not work. Taiwan has developed its own identity and culture that are very different from the ones in Mainland China. Should the PRC hope for a peaceful unification short of a war, the Chinese government needs to recognize the people in Taiwan’s different identity and apply consistent and positive approaches to gain the people’s trust.