In June, Taiwanese YouTuber “Potter King” (陳加晉, Chen Chia-chin) revealed in a video posted to his channel that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP, 中國共產黨) was sponsoring a group of Taiwanese influencers to travel in China and make videos praising the Chinese government. Following this announcement, it was revealed that several Taiwanese YouTubers had traveled to Xinjiang in August, including one popular vlogger called “Ariel” with an audience of 1.1 million subscribers. Ariel once expressed her support of Hong Kong in a video during the 2019 Anti-Extradition Protests, but the footage was removed from her YouTube channel without any explanation. Although Ariel denied the trip was funded by any Chinese organization and that she didn’t make any money off of the content she posted about her trip to Xinjiang, her decision still garnered serious criticism from Taiwanese netizens.
In the months since, Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council (大陸委員會) has confirmed Potter King’s claim and begun investigating the extent of Chinese infiltration into the information space of online influencers. According to Liang Wen-chieh (梁文傑), deputy head of Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council, although these influencers and celebrities paid for their flights, after they land in China, the host organizations will cover all the expenses they have during their stay. These cases not only aroused public vigilance against China’s infiltration in Taiwan, but also illustrated the difficulties of determining the extent to which and how influencers are affected by the CCP.
Paid Junkets and Celebrity Endorsements under the Sponsorship of the “United Front”
Taiwanese YouTubers are being targeted as part of the CCP’s “united front work” (統一戰線工作), a term invented by the CCP for influence operations that advance the party’s goals. The tactic of recruiting people who have influence to help promote China’s positive image is by no means a new thing. [1] For example, the Taiwanese YouTuber “Poppy Lai,” who creates content about cosmetic and beauty products, has told the media that she received an email about business cooperation from a Chinese marketing company two years ago. In that email, the company requested that Poppy speak in favor of China in a relatively objective manner while introducing fashion news or cosmetic products.
Earlier this year, two Taiwanese singers, Ho Yi-chi (何以奇) and Hsieh Ho-hsien (謝和弦), both revealed on social media that they had received letters from a Beijing-based media company. The letters invited them to participate in establishing a political party in Taiwan that would transcend the pan-blue and pan-green camps, to be called the “Taiwan Embraces Peace Party”(台灣擁和黨). The letters outlined a plan to recruit Taiwanese entertainers and celebrities to be the founding members, and to hold a concert to promote cross-Strait peace and shared Chinese history, with the ultimate goal of securing at least one mayoral seat and ten city or county councilor seats in the 2026 election. According to the letter, entertainers and celebrities could earn more than ten million NTD (about USD $305,000) per year and benefit from performance opportunities in China as long as they joined and helped promote the new party. Although the letters seem absurd, it not only unveils the CCP’s strategy of utilizing Taiwanese celebrities to influence political dynamics in Taiwan, but also demonstrates a trend in which the CCP is pursuing more diversified and unconventional united front tactics.
Image: The letter from a Beijing-based media company, Beijing Ci-guang Media Co., Ltd. (北京慈光影视传媒有限公司), states its plan to establish a political party in Taiwan. (Source: Ho Yi-chi Facebook post)
Additionally, the case of Chung Ming-hsuan (鍾明軒), a Taiwanese YouTuber who is characterized by his non-binary gender expression, possibly illustrates one of the CCP’s united front operation successes. Chung was originally regarded as a pro-Taiwanese influencer, supported democratic values, and once filmed a video with former President Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) before the 2020 presidential election. Starting from this year, Chung released several vlogs recording his visits to China in which he not only introduced local attractions and praised the high level of public safety in major Chinese cities, but also mentioned that “you can talk about politics freely here.” His content attracted a lot of criticism for whitewashing the CCP’s authoritarian governance. Facing massive condemnation, Chung chose to ignore his critics and continued creating videos about China. The People Republic of China’s (PRC) Taiwan Affairs Office (國務院台灣事務辦公室) positively responded to Chung’s controversy in a press conference, and stated that “Taiwanese youth should follow Chung Ming-husan and visit mainland China often.”
In December 2024, an anti-CCP influencer who uses the name “Pa Chiung” (八炯) released a two-part documentary on YouTube regarding the CCP’s united front work, garnering more than 4 million views in total. Through interviewing a Taiwanese rapper, Chen Po-yuan (陳柏源), who once received guidance from the CCP in order to promote his music work in the PRC, the documentary revealed several new tactics the CCP is using to sway public opinion in Taiwan. For example, the PRC established “Taiwanese Youth Entrepreneurship Parks (台青創業園)” in many cities such as Xiamen (Fujian Province), providing Taiwanese businessmen resources like offices, venture capital, and media promotion to run their own businesses. Similar organizations also recruit artists and online influencers and offer them training programs. Moreover, the documentary alleged that there are Taiwanese playing as intermediaries who assist in the CCP’s united front work. These intermediaries receive large financial support and even obtain PRC IDs while keeping their Taiwanese IDs.
Image: Pa Chiung (right) and Chen Po-yuan (left) interviewed by local media regarding the viral documentary they made to reveal the CCP’s united front work. (Source: CNA photo Dec. 8, 2024)
CCP Goals in Recruiting Taiwan Influencers
With such celebrity endorsements, the PRC seeks to deflect unfavorable foreign narratives and whitewash negative perceptions of it, mostly through highlighting non-political areas like tourism and public safety. The CCP is adopting a more localized, youth-targeted and softer approach, compared to its other tactics like gray-zone intimidation or legal coercion. Furthermore, it has reached out to influencers who were originally pro-independence or supportive of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP, 民進黨), such as Ariel and Chung Ming-hsuan, to be its local collaborators.
A challenge for verifying collaboration between CCP-backed organizations and Taiwanese influencers is that it is difficult to find business contracts or receipts that can prove the influencers really get paid for their content by the CCP. Those influencers creating content praising China can always claim that they do so voluntarily, and that they have nothing to do with the CCP or any Chinese-related sponsorship. Moreover, accusations that are made without evidence could create public resentment against government policies and broadly pro-Taiwan groups for unfairly censoring pro-PRC opinions and violating their freedom of speech.
Political Divisions and Distrust of the Government
As Taiwanese people debate over whether Taiwanese influencers should visit and promote China, two significant risks are the island’s growing political divisions, and distrust towards the government. Opponents of the ruling DPP government criticize those who condemn or boycott visitors to China as violating individual freedoms. They criticize the government’s Five National Security Amendments (國安五法) and the Anti-Infiltration Act (反滲透法), which aim at preventing China from infiltrating and interfering in Taiwanese society, on the alleged grounds of creating an atmosphere in which people cannot express any words in favor of China. There is even a popular saying on social media that jokingly describes the DPP as Taiwan’s version of the Communist Party.
However, when we look at the polling conducted by the Mainland Affairs Council regarding public opinion on the Anti-Infiltration Act, 65 percent of Taiwanese acknowledge the increasing united front operations, infiltration, and intervention by the CCP in Taiwanese society. Over 80 percent support the government’s use of legal instruments to prevent infiltration action, with 50.5 percent agreeing on strengthening the effect and scope of the Anti-Infiltration Act. The contradiction between the polling data and the media content is likely related to Chinese information manipulation. Partnering with Taiwanese actors or media outlets, the CCP creates and spreads content that criticizes Taiwan’s elected government and its institutions in the media environment. Such disinformation echoes an original voice from the anti-DPP constituents, intensifies their sentiment, and then exacerbates the quarrel in Taiwan’s public sphere.
According to Toshi Yoshihara, a GTI advisor and an expert in CCP strategic and military affairs, one of the intentions of China’s united front actions is to “sow divisions within the political systems of competitors in order to weaken them or tie them down.” The CCP leverages these disinformation operations, through fake accounts and local collaborators, not only to exacerbate discord in Taiwanese society but also to create a strong distrust of the Taiwanese government among Taiwanese citizens. Such polarization and lack of confidence in government serve to lower Taiwanese people’s confidence in democratic institutions, as well as to hinder the formation of whole-of-society resilience against Chinese threats.
Simply put, as it faces increasingly stronger legal and societal barriers in Taiwan against Chinese malign information operations, the PRC is utilizing a “Taiwanese-leading-Taiwanese” approach to circumvent these barriers and undermine Taiwan’s resilience.
Domestic Efforts and a Multilateral Approach Integrated in the Indo-Pacific
Considering that billions of dollars are invested in the UFWD every year, the asymmetry of resources and costs across the Strait makes it difficult for Taiwan to fight against Chinese disinformation campaigns and defend its democratic institutions. Therefore, two key areas should receive greater investment in order to bridge this gap. First of all, the Taiwanese government and civil society groups should integrate existing efforts and resources to enhance the research and communication regarding Chinese political warfare. The establishment of the Cognitive Warfare Research Center (認知戰研究中心) and Whole-of-Society Defense Resilience Committee (全社會防衛韌性委員會) are great steps forward for the Taiwanese government. Civil groups like Doublethink Lab and Kuma Academy have accomplished many projects that have advanced public awareness of the PRC threats. However, given the amount of disinformation in Taiwan’s public sphere, more concrete evidence is needed to shed light on contact between Chinese companies and Taiwanese influencers, or records of remittance from the CCP to Taiwanese celebrities, to show the Taiwanese public the importance of these initiatives.
Second, multilateral security alliances in the Indo-Pacific, such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) or AUKUS, should incorporate Taiwan to jointly counter the united front work by the CCP. A report from RAND suggests that the “free and open Indo-Pacific” concept is an ideal vessel to frame this messaging because it illustrates a common vision for most countries in the region. The vitality and innovation of Taiwan’s civil community, as well as its experience in addressing PRC disinformation, would contribute to the alliance when developing information operation (IO) strategies–while countries like the United States and Japan could provide the policy framework and research resources that Taiwan lacks. Moreover, this multilateral approach would perform better than more limited US-Taiwan bilateral cooperation. An overemphasis on US leadership may fall into the PRC’s narrative trap that attempts to promote America Skepticism Theory (疑美論) in Taiwan’s public sphere.
The main point: The CCP is enticing Taiwanese influencers to create pro-China content aimed at whitewashing its authoritarian governance and aggression toward Taiwan, exemplifying its new “Taiwanese-leading-Taiwanese” approach within its united front strategy. United front efforts not only amplify favorable narratives about China but also sow discord within Taiwanese society, undermining Taiwan’s democracy. To counter China’s political warfare, Taiwan must strengthen domestic research and communication initiatives while advocating for the inclusion of multilateral organizations in the Indo-Pacific to foster regional resilience against Chinese influence campaigns.
[1] For a fuller discussion of the concept of united front work, see: John Dotson, The Chinese Communist Party’s Political Warfare Directed Against Taiwan: Overview and Analysis. (Global Taiwan Institute, May 2024), pp. 14-16. https://globaltaiwan.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/OR_CCP-Political-Warfare.pdf.
